Disclaimer
This case study is based on independent, observational research and conceptual analysis of publicly accessible digital identity workflows. No unauthorised access, testing, probing, scanning, or interaction with live VicRoads, myGov, ATO, or related government systems was performed.
All scenarios discussed are derived from documented system design assumptions, publicly observable user behaviour, and governance-level threat modelling. This material is presented for educational, defensive, and policy analysis purposes only.
Executive Overview
This case study examines consent-based impersonation arising from informal assistance markets, where individuals outsource identity-dependent tasks such as online licensing tests or tax lodgements to third parties in exchange for convenience, time savings, or reduced cost.
Within VicRoads and myGov workflows, identity trust may be established through credentials and approvals without consistently assuring that the legitimate account holder is the individual performing the action. When access is voluntarily delegated to unverified helpers, impersonation risk and personal data exposure can emerge and persist across interconnected government systems.
Scope and Analytical Boundaries
Systems considered:
- VicRoads learner permit, licensing, and hazard perception workflows
- myGov-linked government services involving tax lodgement and other identity-dependent transactions
Behavioural context:
- Outsourcing online tests to ensure a pass
- Using informal or low-cost helpers for tax lodgement
Scope boundaries:
- No interaction with live systems
- No reproduction of misuse behaviour
- No operational or instructional detail
The analysis focuses on how real-world social and economic behaviour intersects with digital identity trust models.
Informal Assistance Markets and Identity Delegation
A central finding of this research is the existence of informal assistance markets surrounding identity-dependent digital services.
These markets commonly involve:
- Third parties offering to complete online licensing or hazard perception tests for a fee
- Informal or unverified helpers providing low-cost tax lodgement services
- Peer-to-peer recommendations shared through social or messaging networks
While often perceived as harmless shortcuts, participation requires users to voluntarily delegate identity access to individuals operating outside formal governance frameworks. This delegation represents the primary entry point for consent-based impersonation.
Affected Risk Demographics and Exposure Conditions
The behaviours examined are not driven by malicious intent. They are most frequently observed among individuals experiencing:
- Time pressure
- Financial constraint
- Limited digital confidence
- Administrative complexity
Groups commonly exposed to elevated identity and data risk include:
- Young or first-time applicants
- Low-income or financially constrained individuals
- People with significant work or caregiving responsibilities
- Migrants and non-native language speakers navigating unfamiliar systems
- Older or digitally marginalised users
Across these groups, identity delegation is typically a pragmatic response to circumstance rather than a disregard for personal data safety.
Core Identity and Data Exposure Risk
The core risk examined is identity validation without assurance that the legitimate account holder is the individual performing the action.
Once access is voluntarily delegated to complete an identity-dependent task, such as a licensing test or tax lodgement, the proxy gains visibility into the legitimate account holder’s personally identifiable information as part of normal session interaction.
In these scenarios:
- Systems cannot reliably distinguish the legitimate account holder from a proxy
- Approved access is treated as proof of account ownership
- PII associated with the account becomes visible to the individual performing the task
As a result, trusted identity states may be established or reinforced by someone other than the account holder, while personal data is simultaneously exposed outside governed control boundaries.
Systemic Conditions Enabling Risk
This risk arises from the convergence of three systemic factors:
- Economic and social incentives that encourage users to trade identity control for convenience, speed, or affordability
- Trust assumptions in digital systems that treat granted consent as proof of account-holder action
- Federated trust inheritance, where outcomes from one system are relied upon by others without reassessment
Together, these conditions allow impersonation exposure and personal data leakage to occur without technical compromise and remain largely invisible.
Authentication Model Constraints and Limitations
This risk does not apply uniformly across all authentication models.
Workflows that enforce strong, device-bound authentication, such as passkeys or equivalent cryptographic credentials, materially reduce the feasibility of identity delegation. When consistently applied:
- Authentication is bound to a specific device and user presence
- Credentials cannot be easily shared or forwarded
- Informal outsourcing becomes significantly harder to perform
Risk may persist where:
- Strong authentication is not enforced at all stages
- Legacy credentials or one-time codes remain available
- Fallback or recovery paths operate with weaker assurance
- Trust established earlier is reused downstream
In mixed authentication environments, the weakest permitted assurance path often determines overall exposure.
Downstream and Federated Impact
Once identity trust is established through a delegated or impersonated interaction:
- Licensing outcomes may be linked to verified government identity
- myGov-linked services may rely on inherited trust
- Identity confidence may increase rather than decrease over time
This amplifies the impact of a single delegated interaction across multiple services.
Governance and Defensive Control Considerations
The following defensive strategies address identity assurance gaps, personal data exposure, and trust continuity risks, particularly in environments where informal assistance markets exist:
- Community and institutional education programs, including schools, licensing pathways, and migrant or settlement services, should proactively communicate the risks of identity delegation and credential sharing, setting clear expectations around digital identity ownership before unsafe behaviours become normalised.
- Presence-based identity verification at identity-forming events such as online licensing and hazard perception tests
- Session-bound authentication with risk-aligned trust expiry
- Behavioural and contextual anomaly detection for proxy or repeated third-party interaction patterns
- Reduced-trust handling of delegated access scenarios with constrained capabilities
- Reassessment of trust at federated service boundaries
- Sandboxed assessment environments with PII isolation and least-privilege access
- Clear user-facing warnings and education on identity delegation risks
- Governance pathways to report and disrupt informal identity outsourcing services
Strategic Summary
The primary risk examined in this case study does not stem from hacking or advanced technical attacks, but from the normalisation of outsourcing identity-dependent tasks.
When informal assistance markets intersect with digital identity systems designed around assumed account-holder action, and when strong authentication is inconsistently applied, identity assurance and personal data protection can fail simultaneously.
Protecting digital identity therefore requires systems that anticipate human behaviour, assure legitimate account ownership, and contain personal data exposure even when delegation occurs.